What the Alasania Scandal Means for Russo-Georgian Relations

Irakli Garibashvili (Press office photo)

Irakli Garibashvili (Press office photo)

Georgia’s recent scandal involving former Defense Minister Irakli Alasania is now winding down.

The government managed to avert a crisis. Not only did they succeed in retaining their majority in parliament but also expanded it. The addition of independent MPs and defectors from Alasania’s camp have increased the Georgian Dream’s share of seats to 87, even higher than the original 83 prior to the Alasania scandal. This not only averted a potential new parliamentary election, but also now gives the Georgian Dream a comfortable and secure majority.

In addition, the vacant ministerial posts have been filled. Prime Minister Garibashvili has also selected Tamar Beruchashvili as the new Foreign Minister. He also appointed Georgia’s former ambassador to Greece, Davit Bakradze (not to be confused with the Saakashvili political ally and former presidential candidate) as the country’s new Euro Integration Minister.

Yet, a significant question continues to linger: does the scandal indicate a Georgian U-turn toward Moscow? The simple answer is “not anytime soon.”

A potential Georgian U-turn seemed more likely in late 2013 and early 2014, as Saakashvili left office. At that time, Georgia had not yet signed the EU Association Agreement and was scheduled to do so in far-off August. There were also emerging signs of a growing thaw between Moscow and Tbilisi, culminating in Vladimir Putin’s invitation to President Giorgi Margvelashvili during the Sochi Winter Olympics for a one-on-one meeting.

However, the rapprochement was disrupted by the Ukraine crisis. The West redoubled its efforts to bring Georgia into its fold, by moving up the signing of the Association Agreement in June, by granting Tbilisi more EU aid money, and by persuading the formerly pro-Putin Georgian Orthodox Patriarch to become pro-EU.  The fear of a possible Georgian Maidan and the tragic legacy of the 1990s civil war in Georgia also loom large in the thoughts of Georgia’s pragmatists.

Therefore, a potential Georgian U-turn toward Moscow appears unlikely, at least for the time being. Also, much is contingent on how developments progress in Ukraine and if the cash-strapped, pro-Western government in Kiev can last.

Still, the departure of Alasania’s Free Democrats and the government’s comfortable majority in parliament certainly does grant more maneuvering room for dealing with Moscow. Specifically, this gives the government a mandate for expanding relations with Russia beyond trade and economic spheres.

Abkhaz President Raul Khajimba (PIA)

Abkhaz President Raul Khajimba (PIA)

For now, this will not mean that Georgia will abandon its pursuit of the EU and NATO, though without Alasania, such efforts will become less strident and aggressive. Likewise, it will not signal an immediate mutually acceptable solution to the longstanding Abkhaz and Ossetian conflicts.

However, the new situation does create the conditions for the dormant high-level meeting proposed by Putin in Sochi to be realized, and for diplomatic ties to be restored between both countries. It will also allow for a greater dialogue between Tbilisi and its breakaways and for the realization of important confidence-building measures vital to future peace. For South Ossetia, this includes a possible reopening of the Ergneti market and, for Abkhazia, a possible reopening of the Abkhaz railway. The Abkhaz President Raul Khajimba has already offered his support for the latter.

Some may contest the idea that Tbilisi would ever consider a serious rapprochement with Moscow. The Georgians, they argue, are simply too proud and nationalistic to let this happen. The Russians too, they would contend, would be unwilling to accept anything less than the total capitulation of Tbilisi, including its full recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence.

However, such arguments are purely impressionistic, based on long-standing ethnic stereotypes played up by the media. In reality, there is nothing in the “Georgian national character” that makes all Georgians, by fate of their ethnic origins, inherently “nationalistic,” “Russophobic,” or “reckless.” Likewise the Russians are not “uncompromising, stubborn imperialists.” In fact, Russia has a history of flexibility, compromise, and openness – provided that its interests and international law and procedure are respected.

Zurab Abashidze (PIA)

Zurab Abashidze (PIA)

In fact, the facts reveal a different story from the mainstream narrative. The vast majority of Georgians want to restore relations with Russia. According to a poll by Georgia’s Kviris Palitra newspaper, 59.4% of Georgians favor continuing the Abashidze-Karasin format. Only 19.7% opposed it, while 20.9% were unsure. The poll was conducted very recently, in October 2014 during the controversy over Russia’s proposed treaty of “Alliance and Integration” with Abkhazia. At that time, Georgia’s more hawkish politicians wanted to scrap the Abashidze-Karasin format entirely.

In addition, a good portion of Georgians also favor membership in the Eurasian Union. In 2013, the pro-Western Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) asked Georgians whether or not they supported membership of their country in the Eurasian Union. The results showed that 32% said “yes,” 24% said “no,” 27% said that they “don’t know” while a further 17% support some aspects of it but not others. If one adds the latter figure with the 32% in support, the total actually emerges as 49%.

Another poll from the Kazakh-based Eurasian Development Bank from this year (2014) found support for the Eurasian Union among 53% of Georgia’s population. For comparison, support for the Eurasian Union in Armenia was 64%, while in Azerbaijan, it was 22%. A much earlier poll by Gallup conducted in 2008 found strong support in Georgia for deeper cooperation among the CIS countries. Overall, 11% favored a “single state,” while another 11% favored a “federal state,” and 32% favored an “economic union” for a total of 54% of the population. Meanwhile, 30% favored cooperation as independent states and 16% were “unsure.” In percentages comparable to the 2014 Kazakhstan poll, the total percentages of those who supported integration either as a single state, a federation, or an economic union, was 63% in Armenia and 28% in Azerbaijan.

Taking into account these significant findings, if one were to attach the incentive of a potential Russian-backed peace deal for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it would be difficult to imagine support for Moscow’s Eurasian Union not growing. In fact, it would likely increase substantially.

Giorgi Margvelashvili is congratulated by a supporter after his election as Georgia's president. (AP)

Giorgi Margvelashvili is congratulated by one of his supporters after his election as Georgia’s president. (AP)

In the case of the first two polls from Kviris Palitra and the CRRC, a consistent trend can be discerned. The majority of Georgians favor restored ties with Moscow, a significant number are still “unsure,” while a minority favors a total rejection of all things Russian. If one observes Georgia’s latest election (i.e., the presidential election of 2013), one finds a similar breakdown. Margvelashvili, the pro-Georgian Dream candidate, acquired 62.12% of the votes while the overtly pro-Moscow Nino Burjanadze received 10.19% of the votes. Together, this makes approximately 72.31% of the vote. Davit Bakradze, the UNM candidate, only acquired 21.72% of the vote. Therefore, one can conclude from the election results, combined with the polling data from Kviris Palitra and the CRRC, that the section of the Georgian electorate that is Russophobic, nationalistic, and overtly pro-Western, represents only 20-25% of the total Georgian electorate.

However, within Georgia’s political and intellectual elite, the influence of this group grows significantly. This is enhanced by the fact that, in the 2012 parliamentary election, which was conducted while Saakashvili was still in office, the UNM still gained 40% of the vote, allowing them to maintain significant influence in the Georgian parliament. In addition, the two major pro-Western opposition blocs, the UNM and the Free Democrats, both have backers and supporters in the West, especially among the American political establishment, both Republicans and Democrats. Further, they are also supported by American-backed NGOs working in Georgia.

There have also been earlier polls, conducted by Gallup, that showed tendencies in the general Georgian society indicating continued admiration, respect, and positive attitudes toward Russia. On the eve of the 2008 war in Georgia, Gallup found that 41% of Georgians agreed with the statement that “it is more important for Georgia to have close relations with Russia even if this can harm relations with the USA.” Another 41% volunteered the response that “it is equally important for Georgia to have close relations with both Russia and USA.” Only 11% agreed with the statement that “it is more important for Georgia to have close relations with the USA even if this can harm relations with Russia.”

To the question “which country in the former Soviet space do you admire and look up to most of all?,” 40% responded “Russia,” 29% “Ukraine,” and the remainder other countries. In addition, 64% of Georgians agreed with the statement that “Georgia has to have good relations with Russia by all means.”

Mikheil Saakashvili at the UN (Reuters)

Mikheil Saakashvili at the UN (Reuters)

These very friendly attitudes soured after the 2008 war. In the subsequent poll conducted in 2009 by Gallup, only 47% agreed with the statement that “Georgia has to have good relations with Russia by all means.” 37% agreed that “Georgia has to have a principal position regarding Russia.” Significantly, only 5% agreed with “terminating all relations with Russia,” which is effectively the policy that Mikheil Saakashvili pursued after the war and which the UNM continues to support today.

The number of those who agreed with the statement that “it is more important for Georgia to have close relations with Russia even if this can harm relations with the USA” dropped to 28%. Meanwhile those who agreed that “it is more important for Georgia to have close relations with the USA even if this can harm relations with Russia” increased to 24%.

Inquiring about the EU, Gallup determined that in 2008, only 14% agreed with the statement that “it is more important for Georgia to have close relations with the EU even if this can harm relations with Russia.” This increased in 2009 to 27%. Meanwhile, 33% said “it is more important for Georgia to have close relations with Russia even if this can harm relations with the EU.” This decreased to 22% in 2009. Finally, 44% of Georgians volunteered “it is equally important for Georgia to have close relations with both Russia and EU.” This decreased to 34% in 2009.

Bidzina Ivanishvili (AFP / Vano Shlamov)

Bidzina Ivanishvili (AFP / Vano Shlamov)

It is indisputable that the development of these new attitudes was affected by the war and by Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, it is also worth noting that people in Georgia became increasingly more afraid to express their opinions openly as Saakashvili’s regime became increasingly more authoritarian. According to Gallup, in 2012, only 17% of the population agreed with the statement that “no one is afraid to express their opinion.” This shot up to 40% in 2013, after the election of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party.

For his part, Saakashvili’s approval rating in Georgia stood at a mere 22% in 2012 according to Gallup. The approval rating was exactly the same in August 2014, according to a later poll conducted by the CRRC for the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The figure again corresponds to the fact that about 20-25% of the Georgian electorate supports a tougher line toward Russia. Significantly, the latter poll also found that 73% of Georgians are presently dissatisfied with the current state of relations with Russia and that 65% supported the reopening of the Abkhaz railway. In another more recent CRRC poll, 91% of the Georgian population indicated that they still speak Russian as a second language, despite Saakashvili’s efforts to supplement this with English. For comparison in Armenia, 97% speak Russian as a second language while in Azerbaijan, 73% speak Russian.

Still, as of August 2014, support for the EU and NATO remains high in Georgia at 78% and 72% respectively according to the CRRC’s NDI poll. This is despite the fact that, in a typical post-Soviet manner, many Georgians also support membership in the Eurasian Union. Indeed, many would claim to support “both,” especially in the regions. In the case of the EU, the majority (58%) believe that eventual membership will improve the Georgian economy. However, it must be emphasized again that the “vision” of Europe and the reality of Europe are very much different. Brussels is still recovering from the Eurozone crisis and it is unlikely that, if Georgia were to eventually join the EU, it would see any immediate economic benefit, as was the case with the bloc’s newest Eastern European members – Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia.

Kakheti, Georgia: A People and Their Wine

Kakheti, Georgia: A People and Their Wine (Eurasia Travel)

Yet, as far as the EU and NATO are concerned, membership in these organizations is not a priority for most Georgians. In fact, in their view, Georgia’s main priorities are unemployment, poverty, pensions, and healthcare reform, as well as fixing relations with Russia and resolving the Abkhaz and South Ossetian issues. According to the CRRC’s NDI poll, only 10% regard NATO as a priority while 2% regard the EU as a priority. Additionally, according to the same poll, about 40% of respondents agreed with the statement that “Georgia is not going anywhere” and about 70% consider their job status to be “unemployed.”  Under the present government, more action has been taken to meet these needs.  In Kakheti province, the center of the Georgian wine-making and grape cultivation, Garibashvili was well-received as he told local farmers, “in the last two years, our government planted four hectares of vineyards as an incentive for the peasants, while Saakashvili forced the peasants to cut down with their own hands the vineyards, which even Shah Abbas or other very cruel conquerors did not do.”

In general, all of this information illustrates that a significant pro-Russian sentiment does exist among the Georgian populace, regardless of claims to the contrary. Such support is most likely concentrated in the regions where poverty and unemployment remain widespread and where nostalgia for Soviet times persists. Consequently, if Georgia were to move toward Russia, concurrently with a Moscow-backed peace deal on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is conceivable that the “silent majority” of Georgians would support the government. Therefore, the major concern for the government would not be the majority of the people, but rather the pro-Western hardliners in the political elite and their supporters.

In this regard, Tbilisi’s pragmatists face major challenges. Constant threats from Saakashvili and the UNM to launch a Georgian Maidan are being taken very seriously by the government. To a Georgian, such threats are especially troubling, given the legacy of the 1990s civil war in Georgia. If something like this were to happen, it would be a disaster for Georgia domestically and would seriously jeopardize very critical efforts at reconciliation with the Abkhaz and Ossetes. The stakes are high.

Saakashvili Addresses Supporters at the UNM Rally in Tbilisi (Reuters / David Mdzinarishvili)

Saakashvili Addresses Supporters at the UNM Rally in Tbilisi (Reuters / David Mdzinarishvili)

In this context, the government was especially cautious and restrained during the UNM’s recent rally against the proposed Russo-Abkhaz “Alliance and Integration” treaty that took place in Tbilisi on 15 November. Thousands of protestors attended the rally, some carrying anti-Putin placards and signs that read “Abkhazia and Samachablo [a Georgian nationalist term for South Ossetia] are Georgia.”  Addressing the rally via live video from Kiev, Mikheil Saakashvili told the crowds that there were two Georgias: “our Georgia” and “Ivanishvili’s Georgia.” Insulting Ivanishvili’s Imeretian peasant roots, Tbilisi-born Saakashvili bombastically declared that Ivanishvili’s “dream Georgia” is a “small, insignificant village that should not have regional ambitions” and that is “run by a provincial dictator.” He further provocatively drew parallels between the Georgian government and the government of ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.

All of this has underscored the need for extreme caution and prudence by the Georgian government.  Prime Minister Garibashvili perhaps said it best in a statement on 14 November, a day before the UNM rally:

I do not think that anyone can overlook the tightrope Georgia is walking today. Radicalism is absolutely unacceptable and inadmissible in our country today. Any step other than a peaceful, prudent, and pragmatic policy may lead us to grave consequences. Imprudent actions and radicalism led Georgia to the 2008 war. This must serve as an example to everyone; we cannot build our decision making upon emotions.

Georgia: Crisis Averted

Georgia's embattled former Defense Minister Irakli Alasania

Georgia’s embattled former Defense Minister Irakli Alasania.

This week sparks flew in Georgian politics. A corruption case, that involved high level officials in the Georgian Defense Ministry, culminated in the dismissal of Defense Minister Irakli Alasania by Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili.

Regarded as a pro-Western hardliner within the context of the Georgian Dream, Alasania had uneasy relations with the rest of the ruling coalition. These date back to at least January 2013 when Alasania was demoted from the post of First Deputy Prime Minister by then-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili also favored Giorgi Margvelashvili for the post-Saakashvili presidency, passing up Alasania’s long-time ambition for that post. Disagreements emerged between Alasania and Ivanishvili on the future political course of Georgia, with Alasania favoring a strong presidential system and Ivanishvili favoring a parliamentary one. A pragmatist interested in resetting ties with Russia, Ivanishvili also did not trust Alasania due to the latter’s more hawkish stance on relations with Moscow.

Following this, the ruling coalition continued to face tensions with Alasania, who practically managed the Defense Ministry as his own autonomous structure. This deprived the pragmatists in the ruling coalition of control of a critical institution, which Alasania used to push Georgia toward a renewed confrontation with Moscow. Among other things, Alasania played host to visits from major American security figures like Defense Secretary Hagel and NATO commander Breedlove. Such moves, together with the recent granting to Georgia of a “NATO aid package,” further alienated Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Above all, they aggravated and antagonized Russia, which regards NATO expansion as a threat to regional security.

Alasania reviews the troops (Voice of America)

Alasania reviews the troops (Voice of America)

When Moscow officially expressed its concern about a potential NATO presence in the Caucasus on 9 October, Alasania responded that same day, claiming that Russia and its “aggression against Ukraine” represented the only “big threat” to the region. He further stated that Tbilisi would never “bow” to a “diktat” from Moscow over establishing NATO training facilities on Georgian soil.

Such remarks likely embarrassed pragmatists in the ruling coalition who seek improved relations with Russia. When asked by reporters whether or not he agreed with Alasania’s statements, Prime Minister Garibashvili only responded, “Alasania and [his political ally] Petriashvili are members of our government.”

Moscow’s response to the rhetoric was to enhance ties with Georgia’s breakaways and to propose a controversial treaty of “Alliance and Integration” with Abkhazia. The text of the proposed treaty sparked negative reactions in Georgia and Abkhazia. It also communicated to Tbilisi that if it did not take Moscow’s concerns with NATO seriously, then it may lose any remaining chance at reconciliation with the Abkhaz permanently.

The corruption cases against the Defense Ministry officials and the subsequent political scandal occurred within this context. However, the rhetoric of Alasania against the government, claiming that the prosecutions represented an “attack” on Georgia’s European integration, was the breaking point.

Irakli Garibashvili

Irakli Garibashvili

This was more than the pragmatists could bear. Prime Minister Garibashvili sacked Alasania and replaced him with Mindia Janelidze.  In his subsequent remarks, Garibashvili harshly and openly criticized the former Defense Minister as a “traitor” and as an “adventurer, stupid and ambitious.” He added:

Personally for me what Alasania has done is a betrayal of the October 1, 2012 victory [of the Georgian Dream in the parliamentary elections]. This is yet another attempt to deceive the Georgian people – he has done it more than once previously and our population will see it, they will see many surprises.

…We are not afraid of adventurers like Alasania… and we will of course easily overcome these absurd obstacles. What he has done, which was done in Saakashvili’s style, raises many questions.

…I want to firmly state to our population that we are the strong state, we are united, strong government and our strength is demonstrated in our democracy; our institutions work properly and there will be no obstacles either in the government or in the Parliament. There is no threat of crisis whatsoever. We will have strong majority in the Parliament and the government will continue to work with more efficiency.

On the other hand it’s not bad – the sooner such traitor people would have been sidelined from our team, the better for us and our people and the country.

Alasania’s dismissal prompted an official split of his party, the Free Democrats, from the Georgian Dream coalition. It also prompted the resignation of Alasania loyalists Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze (Alasania’s sister-in-law), State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration Aleksei Petriashvili, and Georgia’s Representative to NATO Levan Dolidze. Notably, Georgia’s Justice Minister Tea Tsulukiani, stayed loyal to the ruling coalition, despite rumors that she too might resign given her association with Alasania’s party.

Tamar Beruchashvili (RFE/RL)

Tamar Beruchashvili (RFE/RL)

Initially, some of Panjikidze’s deputy ministers in the Foreign Ministry resigned as well, including Tamar Beruchashvili and Davit Jalagania. However, through person-to-person meetings and swift political maneuvering, Garibashshvili managed to persuade almost all of these deputy ministers to reconsider their decisions and stay loyal to the ruling coalition. The only exception was Davit Zalkaliani, Georgia’s representative for the Geneva talks with Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.

It is rumored that Beruchashvili may replace Petriashvili, though Garibashshvili has neither confirmed nor denied this. The position of Foreign Minister also remains vacant. A possible contender for that post might be Georgia’s current envoy to Russia, Zurab Abashidze. One of the country’s most experienced diplomats, his presence would give Tbilisi more gravitas in international affairs.

The Georgian Dream was also able to retain a majority in parliament, despite speculation from some observers that the resignation of Alasania would prompt a breakup of the coalition and possibly new elections. Instead, three of Alasania’s deputies in parliament have decided to leave Alasania’s Free Democrats and remain part of the Georgian Dream coalition. Conversely one member of the Georgian Dream left the ruling coalition to side with Alasania. Regardless, the addition of the defectors from the Alasania camp and some independent MPs have allowed the Georgian Dream to maintain a majority and prevent a new parliamentary election.

Irakli Garibashvili (Agenda.ge)

Irakli Garibashvili (Agenda.ge)

Overall, Garibashvili’s moves, combined with his continued reassurances on Georgia’s “European course” managed to maintain the stability of the Georgian government and to avert a potential political crisis.  Only one year into his tenure as Prime Minister, the 32-year-old Garibashvili has already begun to come into his own and prove himself to be a truly effective and pragmatic political leader, with Georgia’s best national interests at heart.

Further, Georgian President Margvelashshvili, abroad in Austria, likewise commented on the situation.  Despite prior disagreements with Garibashshvili, he appeared to side with the pragmatists and did not challenge Alasania’s dismissal. For his part, the philosopher-president called for a meeting to be convened to assess the progress of Georgia’s European integration. At the same time, in recent weeks, he has continued to signal interest in a pursuing a one-on-one meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was proposed by Putin himself during the Sochi Winter Olympics in February, but still remains unrealized.

Bidzina Ivanishvili and Irakli Alasania (Interpress News Agency)

Bidzina Ivanishvili and Irakli Alasania (Interpress News Agency)

Ivanishvili himself weighed in on the Alasania scandal. On 7 November, he met with Alasania in a closed-door meeting at his business center. The precise details of the discussion were not disclosed, though after the meeting, Alasania stated:

We have exchanged views about the current political situation in the country. It was a very frank conversation. An agreement was reached that we should proceed the political process in a way that will not damage the state – that was mainly the substance of our conversation. We discussed many issues, but it will naturally remain between us.

The departure of Alasania and his Free Democrats has significantly minimized the presence of the hawk faction in Georgia’s ruling coalition. The Republican Party of Parliamentary Speaker Davit Usupashvili is now the only remaining hardline group within the coalition. This places Usupashvili in a precarious position.

Davit Usupashvili (Agenda.ge)

Davit Usupashvili (Agenda.ge)

Immediately prior to the split, Usupashvili seems to have attempted a mediation between Alasania and the pragmatists in an effort to prevent this outcome. Commenting on the situation to reporters, he stated that the split was caused by the fact that “all main participants of the process have wittingly or unwittingly hurried up excessively.” He also regretted the departure of Alasania and the Free Democrats as an “important loss.”

Meanwhile, Usupashvili’s wife, Tina Khidasheli, openly criticized Garibashvili’s remarks on Alasania, placing the Parliamentary Speaker in an even more difficult spot. In spite of this, Usupashvili is unlikely to step down from his post for now.  Further, he does not represent a seriously destabilizing factor for the ruling coalition in the way that Alasania did.

Reactions on the Alasania scandal from aboard have varied. In the US, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki expressed “strong concerns” about Alasania’s dismissal and about “political retribution” in Georgia. In Europe, Sweden’s recently dismissed ex-Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, one of the continent’s foremost anti-Russian hawks, warned on Twitter of a “grave political crisis” and that the “path of the country is under threat.” Bildt is not well-liked by the ruling coalition. Earlier this year, Garibashshvili accused him of being part of a “club of Saakashvili’s friends.”

Grigory Karasin (TASS / Valery Sharifulin)

Grigory Karasin (TASS / Valery Sharifulin)

Meanwhile, Moscow has been reportedly watching events unfold with great interest. In an interview with TASS, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin remarked that “resignations taking place in the Georgian government, firstly, modify the government itself and secondly, it is important to understand how it will affect the Georgian government’s course.” He added, “we are watching closely and analyzing these developments.”

It is clear that Alasania’s future in Georgian politics will be greatly reduced. Despite his popular following, Alasania simply does not have the mass backing behind him needed to become a real competitor. Predictably, he completely rejected any cooperation with the opposition United National Movement (UNM), the party of Alasania’s bitter rival, Mikheil Saakashvili. Meanwhile, the prosecutions against the arrested Defense Ministry officials continue and Alasania has not ruled out potential investigations by prosecutors against himself. Overall, it was Alasania’s provocative actions and rhetoric that nearly led Georgia into political crises, both at home and in the region. Tbilisi’s pragmatists can be relieved to see his departure, in addition to seeing a political crisis averted.

UPDATE (9 November 2014): Bidzina Ivanishvili gave an extensive interview to the Georgian Public Broadcaster on 8 November discussing current political events in Georgia, including the Alasania scandal.  For more information on Ivanishvili’s interview, see my full analysis here.

Georgian Defense Ministry in Hot Water

Georgian Defense Ministry Building, Tbilisi (Georgian Ministry of Defense)

Georgian Defense Ministry Building, Tbilisi (Georgian Ministry of Defense)

On 28 October, a major scandal erupted in Georgia. Five high-ranking officials in the Georgian Defense Ministry were arrested for embezzling 4,102,872 GEL (over $2 million USD) from the state budget. The court ordered a pre-trial detention of the arrested officials.

The scandal sent shock waves throughout Georgia since it has certain political implications for Tbilisi’s current Defense Minister, Irakli Alasania. Regarded as one of the most prominent anti-Russian hawks in the ruling Georgian Dream coalition, Alasania has been a staunch supporter of Georgian NATO membership.  He was abroad when the scandal emerged, on a trip to shore up security ties in Europe.

In the meantime, the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office called for Alasania’s deputy, Aleksandr Batiashvili, to be questioned as a witness and has not ruled out the possible questioning of Alasania himself.  US Ambassador Richard Norland voiced Washington’s “full confidence” in Alasania.

Irakli Alasania (Mzia Saganelidze / RFE/RL)

Irakli Alasania (Mzia Saganelidze / RFE/RL)

Upon his return to Tbilisi on 1 November, Alasania gave full support to his employees.  “I am confident that my brothers-in-arms and my colleagues are completely innocent,” he told reporters.  “I will focus all my attention on them in order not to make them feel that they are oppressed – regrettably there already are elements of this in a  way, how the [court] process was conducted behind the closed doors.”  Later, the Ministry of Defense officially demanded a declassification of the case.

The embattled Defense Minister maintained that “from the security point of view, a huge blow has already been struck to our country with these [arrests].”  He emphasized that he would seek “high-level political consultations” with the President, Prime Minister, and Parliamentary Speaker about the case which he claims has “damaged our country’s security.”  When asked about possible political motives, Alasania stated, “whether there are political motives or not, we will talk about it later.”

Irakli Garibashvili (Agenda.ge)

Irakli Garibashvili (Agenda.ge)

There is now widespread speculation over whether or not Alasania will resign from his position as Defense Minister.  When journalists asked Prime Minister Garibashvili on whether or not Tbilisi would ask for such a resignation, he responded “I think you hurry too much,” adding that “this case is very regrettable. We should all wait for the investigation and we should allow the prosecutor’s office to investigate this case in order not to leave any question unanswered.”

A possible Alasania resignation would not be surprising. His relations with the ruling coalition have been uneasy for some time. After the victory of the Georgian Dream coalition in 2012, Alasania was appointed to two posts simultaneously: First Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister.  He hoped to gain the Georgian Presidency and to this end, secure the endorsement of the coalition’s primary leader Bidzina Ivanishvili.

However, there were political disagreements between Alasania and Ivanishvili over whether or not Georgia should have a presidential or parliamentary form of government, with Alasania favoring the former and Ivanishvili the latter.  Further, Ivanishvili also did not trust Alasania, especially because of Alasania’s hawkish line toward Moscow with whom Ivanishvili sought to restore relations. Consequently, Ivanishvili demoted Alasania leaving him in the post of Defense Minister, passed him up for the presidency, and instead favored the former Education Minister and philosopher, Giorgi Margvelashvili as the new post-Saakashvili President.

An uneasy partnership: Irakli Alasania with Bidzina Ivanishvili (Civil.ge)

An uneasy partnership: Irakli Alasania with Bidzina Ivanishvili (Civil.ge)

Alasania was upset by the move, but this frustration was not only limited to him and his political circle. He also has backers in the West, particularly in Washington, who wanted him to assume the presidency. Notably, following Ivanishvili’s decision, articles suddenly emerged in Western publications such as The Economist, with fresh criticism of the Georgian billionaire and renewed speculation of his being a pro-Russian puppet. However, again, this is not the case. Ivanishvili is pro-Georgian as opposed to being either pro-Western or pro-Russian.

Regardless, Alasania’s relations with the ruling coalition were also tested by his relentlessly push for NATO membership and his anti-Russian discourse, which became especially prominent after the Ukraine crisis. His total promotion of NATO has, among other things, alarmed the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians.  Notably, within the context of Mikheil Saakashvili’s government, Alasania was known as someone willing to compromise with the breakaways. He had especially good contacts with the Abkhaz and earlier sought to build peace with Sukhumi through dialogue. For their part, the Abkhaz liked working with Alasania. Ivanishvili, who made a reconciliation with Georgia’s breakaways a top priority, likely recognized this. Indeed, Alasania’s constructive working relations with the Abkhaz may be part of the reason that he was included in the Georgian Dream coalition initially.

Giorgi Margvelashvili (Civil.ge)

Giorgi Margvelashvili (Civil.ge)

However, in his position as Defense Minister, Alasania’s total advocacy for NATO has only created greater distrust with Sukhumi and Tshkinvali. Both view potential Georgian NATO membership as “proof” that, despite the rhetoric, “Georgia is really not interested in dialogue” and that “nothing has changed.”  Other Georgian leaders, such as President Giorgi Margvelashvili, have sought to allay Abkhaz and Ossete fears, emphasizing that NATO membership is not intended to be against them. Pragmatists within the ruling coalition likely see the pursuit of NATO as more of a negotiating chip with Moscow in return for a future peace plan with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

However, such reassurances did little to assuage fears in Sukhumi and Tshkinvali, especially given the history of conflict between these two regions and Tbilisi both in the early 1990s and again in 2008. Instead, as they have done traditionally, both regions have sought greater security ties with Moscow, which shares their disapproval of a potential NATO presence in the Caucasus. To this end it was reported immediately before the September NATO summit in Wales that Moscow intended to bolster ties with both regions.

Alasania and Hagel (Getty)

Alasania and Hagel (Getty)

At the NATO summit, Georgia was granted a “NATO aid package” which would establish a NATO training facility in Georgia and allow for the “occasional” holding of NATO military exercises on Georgian soil. Moscow, already faced with a crisis in Ukraine, was understandably alarmed and even more so when individuals such as US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and NATO commander Philip Breedlove, began to appear in Georgia. It is likely that Alasania and the Defense Ministry played an instrumental role in organizing such visits, irritating Moscow and testing the Russo-Georgian reconciliation process.

On October 9, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed fresh concern over plans to place “NATO-linked infrastructure” in Georgia. Defense Minister Irkali Alasania immediately retorted that the only “big threat” to the region is Russia itself, given its support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia and what he deemed was “ongoing aggression carried out by Russia against Ukraine.” He also told reporters that Russia cannot stop Georgia from establishing NATO training facilities on its own territory. “We will never bow to the Russians,” he said “to a ‘diktat’ from Russia on what is better for Georgia.” Predictably, his controversial remarks sparked anger in Moscow. They also must have embarrassed Tbilisi, and seemingly contradicted efforts by Margvelashvili and Garibashvili at pursuing a more pragmatic approach toward Russia.

Alasania’s statements also came amid rumors that he may even leave the ruling coalition to pursue his own political ambitions in Georgia in the 2016 parliamentary elections. If he does leave the ruling coalition, it is unlikely that he will join Georgia’s foremost hardliners, the United National Movement (UNM), due to his bitter relations with his rival, former President Saakashvili.

The tipping point for Tbilisi must have been Moscow’s proposed treaty of “Alliance and Integration” with Abkhazia. The text of the proposal called for deepening ties with the breakaway republic, so much so that it would have integrated Abkhazia’s military and economic structures almost entirely with Russia’s. It would also enhance the number of Russian troops along the de facto Abkhaz-Georgian border.

The reaction to the treaty was negative in both Abkhazia and Georgia. Though the Abkhaz support the Moscow-backed Eurasian Union, they viewed the treaty as going too far and “infringing on Abkhaz sovereignty.” Even the newly-elected Abkhaz President Khajimba, known for his close ties with officials in Moscow, voiced his disagreement with it. In Georgia, the proposed treaty caused more alarm, with some decrying it as an attempt by Russia to “annex” Abkhazia.

Grigory Karasin (newsinfo.ru)

Grigory Karasin (newsinfo.ru)

In reality, the proposed treaty was likely intended by Moscow to communicate to Tbilisi how seriously it regards a potential NATO presence in the Caucasus. It also signaled to Tbilisi that, while it still has a chance at reconciliation with the Abkhaz, it could lose such an opportunity permanently if it continues to pursue NATO.

The Abkhaz issue dominated the discourse at a subsequent meeting in Prague between Georgia’s Russia envoy, Zurab Abashidze and his counterpart Grigory Karasin.  At the talks, Abashidze beseeched Karasin to have Moscow reconsider the proposed treaty. Karasin retorted that the treaty only concerned both Moscow and Sukhumi, and that nobody could determine the relations between Russia and Abkhazia. He also gave Tbilisi some blunt advice from Moscow: tone down the rhetoric.

Whether or not the recent scandal in the Defense Ministry has anything to do with Alasania’s hawkish posturing remains to be seen. However, his departure would no doubt be a welcome relief for pragmatists in Tbilisi, eager to reset ties with Moscow and to explore realistic solutions to the protracted Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts.  The scandal also comes amid a greater backlash across Europe against anti-Russian hawks, such as Poland’s Radosław Sikorski and Sweden’s Carl Bildt, in light of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine.

UPDATE (4-5 November 2014): On 4 November, Irakli Alasania was officially dismissed from his position as Georgia’s Defense Minister by Prime Minister Garibashvili.  In Alasania’s place as Defense Minister, Tbilisi appointed Mindia Janelidze.  Subsequently, Aleksei Petriashvili, the State Minister for Euro-Atlantic integration and a member of Alasania’s Free Democrats stepped down from his post.  More resignations followed, including that of Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze, Alasania’s sister-in-law, on 5 November.  That same day, Alasania formally announced the official split of his party from the ruling Georgian Dream coalition.

Russia Betrayed?: Voices of the Opposition: A Documentary Film

Here is a must-see prophetic film, especially in light on the continuing crisis in Ukraine.

Produced by Rosemarie Reed on the eve of the 1996 Russian presidential election, it is entitled Russia Betrayed?: Voices of the Opposition. The film includes interviews between Russian scholar Stephen F. Cohen and oppositionists Aleksandr Lebed, Aleksandr Rutskoi, Grigory Yavlinsky, and Gennady Zyuganov. Most interesting are the portions of the film that touch upon Russian foreign policy, Russian-American relations, and NATO expansion.

Watch the entire film in four parts below, presented with permission of the filmmaker:

 

 

 

 

How Moscow Views the Ukraine Crisis

Bonaparte Crossing the Grand Saint-Bernard Pass by Jacques-Louis David, 1800.  The historical memory of the Western invasions of Russia (including the Napoleonic invasion of 1812) still affects Russian perceptions of the West today.

Bonaparte Crossing the Grand Saint-Bernard Pass by Jacques-Louis David, 1800. The historical memories of the West’s invasions of Russia (including the Napoleonic invasion of 1812) still loom large in the Russian consciousness.

Throughout the ongoing Ukraine crisis, few Western commentators and/or observers have considered Moscow’s view of the situation. In the Western media, the prevailing image is that Russia is an aggressor, intent on dominating its neighbors. Western influence is presented as “positive.” Russian influence as “negative.” Joining the EU is depicted as being a road to economic and social prosperity and NATO is offered as a defensive bulwark against the “terrible” Kremlin. Remarkably, at least in the United States, liberals and conservatives are singing the same song. Further, the discourse of “invasion,” “occupation,” “aggression,” and “World War III” is hardly diplomatic. How does anyone believe that negotiations can ensue when such language is thrown about?

By contrast, in Moscow, the view of the situation in Ukraine is entirely different. It perceives the West as encroaching on countries to which it has been very closely associated. Ukraine (the entire country, East, South, Central, and even West), along with Belarus, is viewed as a fraternal East Slavic nation to which Russia is intimately bound. The capital Kiev is regarded by all Russians as the “mother Russian city,” the common point of origin for all East Slavs. To view Kiev within the boundaries of the EU and NATO is more than just a violation of a sphere of influence.  To the Russians, it is almost sacrilege.

Meanwhile, it does not help that some of the most vocal advocates for Ukrainian membership in the EU and NATO come from countries that Russia perceives as historical invaders. They include Poland and Sweden, the co-founders of the Eastern Partnership program that sponsored the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. Both countries have a history of animosity toward Russia, but it is Poland in particular that Moscow views as being one of the chief advocates for Western expansionism.

Minin and Pozharsky Statue in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, Moscow (Kotomka)

Minin and Pozharsky Statue in front of St. Basil’s Cathedral, Moscow (Kotomka)

We in the West regard Poland primarily as the victim of Russian aggression, particularly communism. We reflect on Russia’s participation in Poland’s partitions, its suppression of Polish uprisings, the Polish-Soviet War, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Katyń massacre, and the establishment of communist Poland. Conversely, to a Russian with a sense of history, Poland is perceived as a historical invader, a country that during the Time of Troubles in Russia (1598-1613) supported the Tsar-pretender “False Dmitriy,” attempted to bring Catholicism to Orthodox Russia, and eventually invaded and occupied Moscow in 1609. That invasion was repelled in 1612 by the duo of Kuzma Minin and Dmitriy Pozharsky, whose statue stands today in front of St. Basil’s in Moscow.

Even in more recent times, Russians recall that it was Poland’s Marshal Piłsudski who, during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-21, not only tried to ensure the freedom of Poland, but also sought to annex to Poland large swathes of Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and Western Russia to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of old. Piłsudski is still admired by some in Poland today, including members of the political elite such as the late Polish President Lech Kaczyński and his twin brother, Jarosław. He is also greatly admired by former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.

Russian author Leo Tolstoy in a portrait by Ilya Repin, 1887.

Russian author Leo Tolstoy in a portrait by Ilya Repin, 1887.

Russians likewise recall Polish participation in the Napoleonic invasion of Russia. In Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace, it is the Polish legion that is depicted as being the most fanatically supportive of an expansion toward Russia, so much so that they drown in the River Viliya for Napoleon. Today, the Russians see very much the same thing, except that Napoleon is now replaced by NATO and that the Poles are now showing their loyalty, not by drowning in the Viliya, but by asking for NATO troops to be stationed in their country.

In another Tolstoyan parallel, Moscow also likely views the Ukrainians who protested on the Maidan as being the modern equivalents of the muzhiks of War and Peace. It was the muzhiks who rose up against their oppressive landlords for Napoleon, who they viewed as the embodiment of the French revolutionary ideals of liberté, égalité, et fraternité. Today though, the modern landlords are Ukraine’s corrupt political elite and oligarchs, while the liberal ideals of Napoleon and revolutionary France are today the liberal ideals of Brussels and the European Union. Moscow regards the latter ideals in 2014 just as they regarded Naopleon’s ideals in 1812 – that is, as false promises motivated only by geopolitical ambitions rather than by any genuine sense of altruism.

Given this, it would be wise to recall history before permitting the rhetoric to get too out of control.

Abashidze-Karasin Meeting Today

Georgia's Special Representative for Relations with Russia Zurab Abashidze (Tabula)

Georgia’s Special Representative for Relations with Russia Zurab Abashidze (Tabula)

Today, Georgia’s special envoy to Russia, Zurab Abashidze, will meet with his Russian counterpart Grigory Karasin in Prague to discuss bilateral relations between the two countries and to lay the groundwork for a future meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Georgian political leadership, the first such meeting since 2008.  The Abashidze-Karasin summit was  originally scheduled for March 4-5 but was postponed twice.

The stakes are relatively high for both Tbilisi and Moscow. From a geostrategic perspective, Moscow specifically needs Georgia as part of its planned Eurasian Customs Union. Not only would it geographically link Russia with prospective Eurasian Union member Armenia, but it would also discourage further Western efforts to expand its geopolitical and energy interests into former Soviet territory. Political circles in the West, and particularly Washington, view Georgia as a critical part of its efforts to gain access to natural gas and oil reserves in the Caspian basin and Central Asia.

Moscow views this expansion as a threat to its security. Consequently, Russia has been reaching out to Georgia in recent months. Its efforts include both Medvedev’s August  invitation to Tbilisi to join the Eurasian Union and Putin’s friendly comments toward Georgians during his December press conference. In the meantime, the West has been also reaching out to Georgia, expanding the presence of the EU and NATO, and taking advantage of the fact that Georgia has not yet fully restored its relationship with Russia.

Bidzina Ivanishvili (RFE/RL/Mzia Saganelidze)

Bidzina Ivanishvili (RFE/RL/Mzia Saganelidze)

The post-Saakashvili Georgian Dream government kept the pursuit of the both the EU and NATO on the table, likely as leverage in its relations with Moscow. The major force behind the party, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, is a patriot in his own right who can be best described as neither pro-Western nor pro-Russian, but pro-Georgian. Whoever can offer Ivanishvili, and by extension Georgia, the best deal, Tbilisi will accept. So far, the West recently increased its efforts to bring Georgia fully into its camp. It has moved up the date of Georgia’s planned signing of the EU Association Agreement to June and has discussed the possibility of granting Georgia a NATO MAP (Membership Action Plan) at the next NATO summit in Wales in September. Yet, unlike his predecessor Saakashvili, Ivanishvili and his party have not ruled out the Russian option completely.  In September 2013, just six days after neighboring Armenia formally reversed its course on its EU Association Agreement in favor of Eurasian Union membership, Ivanishvili announced that Georgia too may consider joining the Moscow-backed union “if it will be advantageous for our country.”

In plain Georgian, this means that if Moscow wants to see Georgia join its Eurasian Customs Union, then Georgia needs to be enticed to join. Tbilisi will not accept any solution that would involve forgoing claims to its breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Significantly, Ivanishvili and others in his Georgian Dream party have placed more emphasis on Georgian unity than any other issue. For Georgians, the unity of their state, including all of its historic and ethnically distinct regions is a top priority, even more so than EU or NATO membership.

Irakli Gabribashvili (Government.ge)

Irakli Gabribashvili (Government.ge)

In a December interview with Eduard Shevardnadze’s granddaughter Sophie Shevardnadze on the Moscow-backed news service RT, Georgia’s new Prime Minister Irakli Gabribashvili, expressed his sadness at the present situation vis-a-vis Georgia’s breakaway regions. While acknowledging the mistakes of Georgia’s earlier post-Soviet governments, Gabribashvili stated “we are hurt because our Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers no longer live with us.” He also stated that “if, as a hope – I am quite optimistic about this issue – the Russian government decides one day to reset relations with Georgia by means of peaceful conflict resolution, it will be the best case scenario.”

Consequently, only a peace deal between Georgia and its breakaways involving a federal solution would be the best possible outcome, satisfying all parties in the dispute. Such a solution would ensure Moscow’s security in the region, the unity of the Georgian state, and, most importantly, the ethnic rights of the Abkhaz and the Ossetes.

However, if Moscow tries to entice Georgia to join the Eurasian Union without any incentive for a peace deal on its breakaway regions, then the situation could become very dangerous. If Tbilisi were to make a U-turn on the EU and NATO without any significant concessions from Moscow, then Euromaidan-style civil unrest could break out in Georgia, led by Saakashvili’s party, the United National Movement (UNM). Kiev-style violence and unrest is especially concerning for a country like Georgia, which experienced a very violent civil war in the 1990s. If the UNM were to launch a revolt in Tbilisi, succeed in overthrowing the potentially friendly Georgian Dream government, and replacing it with a staunchly pro-Western nationalist government, then it would be a geopolitical nightmare for Moscow.

Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili (Reuters)

Mikheil Saakashvili (Reuters)

Already the Georgian government is taking precautions in the case of such an eventuality. Prosecutions and questionings of UNM lawmakers and activists, including former President Saakashvili, on various unresolved controversies have increased in recent weeks. Also, Georgia’s Interior Ministry recently spoke of concerns with regard to UNM launching a Maidan-style revolution. Prime Minister Garibashvili has responded by declaring that “no one will dare to stir destabilization in this country while we are in the government” and that “if anyone has any such desire or attempt, they will be strictly punished.”  Indeed, in light of the recent Ukraine crisis, the UNM has become increasingly aggressive, nationalistic, and Russophobic, calling for sanctions against Russia by Georgia, an end to any diplomatic communication with Moscow, and for denial of “Russian aggression against Georgia” to be criminalized. From his base in Ukraine as an advisor to the Yatsenyuk government, Saakashvili has been particularly provocative, not only against his traditional enemy Russian President Putin, but also his domestic arch-rival Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream government, which Saakashvili dismisses as “completely worthless.”

Certainly, the UNM could try to launch a Maidan-style revoltion even if Moscow does grant Tbilisi concessions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, its effectiveness would be greatly diluted given its already declining popularity and the fact that a peace resolution on the two breakaways would seriously undermine their credibility even further among the Georgian public. Conversely, if Moscow attempted to entice Georgia into the Eurasian Union with no concessions on the breakaways, it would create an angry backlash in Georgian society on which the UNM could easily capitalize to launch a “Georgian Maidan” in Tbilisi. Saakashvili might even take advantage of this to restore his political career and return to the Georgian presidency in a coup d’état.

Given this, Russia has to very cautious and very prudent. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back in 2008 has served its purpose by discrediting and neutralizing Saakashvili and by illustrating to the West the potential dangers of the Kosovo precedent.  Now Moscow has to consider its strategic priorities.  Specifically, Russia must ensure its security in the region as well as the overall stability of the Caucasus.

If Moscow can entice Tbilisi into its Eurasian Union, then this would be a major diplomatic success. If not, Russia will continue to be vulnerable to Western expansionism, not just in the Caucasus but in Central Asia as well.  Much of this depends on the outcome of tomorrow’s meeting as well as any future meeting between the Georgian and Russian leaderships. Already there are some concerns because a Georgian TV crew was detained yesterday for accidentally crossing the border into breakaway South Ossetia. Given Moscow’s concerns regarding Georgia, releasing these journalists should be a top priority, which in turn would build trust and confidence between both sides.

How to Defuse the Ukraine Crisis

Below are ten basic provisions that I believe may ameliorate not only the Ukraine crisis but also the broader tension that currently exists between Russia and the West. Not all readers will agree entirely with these positions, but hopefully they will become a starting point from which to defuse the situation, proceed forward, and create mutually friendly, not hostile, relations among all parties:

George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta in December 1989 (ITAR-TASS).  The Bush administration informally promised Gorbachev that NATO would not expand "one inch" beyond East Germany.  The promise was never fulfilled.  To defuse the ongoing Ukraine crisis, a formal, written promise not to expand NATO by Washington to Moscow would do much to build mutual trust and confidence between both countries.

George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta in December 1989 (ITAR-TASS). The Bush administration informally promised Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch” beyond East Germany. The promise was never fulfilled. To defuse the Ukraine crisis, a formal, written promise not to expand NATO by Washington to Moscow would do much to build mutual trust and confidence between both countries.

1. The West and Russia should drop any mutual sanctions or restrictions against one another.

2. In order to encourage mutual trust, Moscow and Washington should make an unambiguous, official agreement prohibiting further expansion and encroachment of NATO into the former Soviet republics. Such an agreement must be clearly articulated in a written document, unlike the informal promise not to expand NATO made by US officials to former Soviet President Gorbachev in the 1990s.

3. The United States must promise to cancel the planned missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.

4. The United States should recognize Russia’s interests in the former Soviet states, including at least verbal support by Washington for the Moscow-based Eurasian Union, provided that it does not expand beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet states.

5. On Crimea, Washington, Brussels, and Kiev should recognize and accept Russia’s incorporation of the peninsula. This may be a difficult step to take, but the West and the Yatsenyuk government have to acknowledge that the area is demographically and historically Russian, and that it is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Moscow will not reverse this action and any attempts to force Russia to do so would be counterproductive. Therefore, Washington, Brussels, and Kiev should recognize the reality that Crimea is effectively part of Russia.

6. On Ukraine, both Moscow and Washington should express a desire to see Ukraine proper united and indivisible, and to adopt either an oblast-by-oblast federal system or a decentralized unitary system. Ukraine should declare military neutrality and should pursue integration into the Eurasian Customs Union based on Ukraine’s logical and historic economic ties with Russia; notwithstanding the fact that the EU economy currently cannot manage Ukraine. If Brussels were to bring in Ukraine, it would seriously threaten the stability and unity of the EU and would unravel the progress made over the decades of forging a united Europe. Both Russia and the EU should cooperate on helping Ukraine to strengthen its economy and state institutions by challenging the stranglehold of the Ukrainian oligarchs.

7. Given the fact that many Moldovan citizens are already EU citizens via Romanian passports, and that Moldova is becoming increasingly integrated with the EU, Moscow should recognize Moldova’s pro-European orientation.  In turn, Chișinău should relinquish its claims to Transnistria.  Depending on the situation in Ukraine and the will of the people of Transnistria, the latter could then reunite with the former as part of the multiethnic, Russophone Odessa Oblast. The new division would occur along the River Dniester, with all Moldovan-controlled areas on the right bank of the river being ceded to Transnistria, and all Transnistrian-controlled areas on the left bank being ceded to Moldova. The remaining Moldovan state would proceed with EU integration, but would declare military neutrality and disavow any intention of reunification with Romania.  Its relationship with the latter would then become akin to the relationship shared between Germany and Austria.  Such a resolution would alleviate ethnic concerns within Moldova, particularly with the Gagauz.

8. On Georgia, Moscow should promote (with the support of Washington) a federal solution for Georgia as well, making Abkhazia and South Ossetia federal states within a unified Georgian republic. The process for this should follow roughly along the lines of the proposed plan that I posted earlier. Like Ukraine, this new united Georgian federal state should declare military neutrality and, for economic, historical, and geographic reasons, should integrate into the Eurasian Customs Union.

9. On Armenia and Karabakh, the solution to this particular issue should be in the principle of self-determination for the Karabakh Armenians, though this is just an opinion. The aggressive and threatening rhetoric and actions from official Baku have only alienated the Karabakh people. Notably, Baku has also consistently denied basic human rights to its own ethnic Azerbaijani citizens. Thus, such a regime could not be trusted to rule over the people of this region. Aside from this, in order for there to be a realistic and lasting solution to this problem, Azerbaijan must open its borders with Armenia and civil society contacts must be enhanced. Armenians and Azerbaijanis can get along, but not when they do not see or communicate with one another. In their common humanity, they will find that peace and coexistence are possible, but the borders must be open first. Turkey too must open its border with Armenia.

10. Both sides should agree on a gradual convergence of the West and Russia (along with the former Soviet states) in economic, political, and military spheres, thus ensuring that all parties are on the same page with regard to the future of the post-Soviet space and post-Cold War world in general. There are so many more important priorities that need to be solved in the world (Iran, North Korea, Syria, etc.). Russia and the West need to cooperate on these issues and must not be in conflict. Further, such a solution would effectively help to realize the long-term goal of a united and indivisible Europe. It would also go a long way toward building trust with Moscow, thus creating the conditions for Russia to deepen its democratic development endogenously.